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THE PARTAI MURBA OF INDONESIA,
A SPLINTER COMMUNIST PARTY

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I. Introduction

The Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) in Indonesia was founded in 1948 by a former representative of the Communist International (Comintern). The party, born during the political confusion of the post-Japanese occupation period and nurtured by the extreme nationalist sentiments during the anti-Dutch campaigns, never matured into a full-fledged political body. Today, it remains one of the numerous minor political parties in Indonesia. It has considerable influence, however, in the top echelon of the Indonesian Government, far in excess of its relative political size and stature.

There has been confusion as to whether or not the Partai Murba is a Communist party. In the years since its formation the party has been variously termed "Trotskyite party", "left-wing nationalist party", "national Communist party", and "extreme nationalist party". This disagreement in identifying the party's principal characteristic exists both within Indonesia, among Indonesian Government officials and political leaders, and outside Indonesia, among non-Indonesian observers. Apparently the confusion arose primarily at the time the Partai Murba was founded, because of the Party's apparent synthesis of Communism and nationalism, the absence of any specific affiliation with the International Communist Movement, the existence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) as the identified arm of the International Communist Movement, and the invective exchanged between the Partai Murba and the PKI in those early days.

Within Indonesia the Partai Murba is not generally accepted or known as a Communist party. There, it is generally accepted as "left-wing nationalist", as another minor and poorly-organized political party in the Indonesian political maelstrom. This view grants the Partai Murba a certain freedom of action and a flexibility which are denied groups identified with the International Communist Movement.

However, a review of the origin, policies, programs, and activities of the Partai Murba leads to the conclusion that it is a splinter Communist party, based on the Communist philosophy, organized on the Communist principles of organization, using Communist tactics,

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III. Predecessor Parties of the Partai Murba

The exact date of TAN's return to Indonesia is unknown. He may have returned as early as 1942, but certainly he was there in August 1945 at the time the Indonesian proclamation of independence was issued. Specific information about TAN's exile--where he went, what he did--is unknown. It is known that he spent at least part of his exile in Japan, where he wrote and published two books on Communism, including one which reviewed the development of the Communist movement in Indonesia.

Although TAN is not known to have been directly involved with any part of the anti-Japanese underground, Adam Malik and Sukarni, his lieutenants during the late 1920's, were the organizers and leaders of an important element of the underground. In the immediate post-war period TAN and his lieutenants were deeply involved in the political machinations that took place. During these first days of the Republic of Indonesia, TAN, or his lieutenants, were represented in most of the numerous cabinets of the newly proclaimed Republic. In these critical days TAN tried several times and through various methods to assume leadership of the government, to replace Sukarno and Hatta by himself. In pursuit of this objective TAN formed in early 1946 the Fighting Front (Persatuan Perdjjuangan), a mass political front, in the fashion of a "national front", headed by TAN and Sukarni. The policies advocated by TAN and the Fighting Front included the abolition of all political parties, a monolithic political structure, confiscation of all foreign property without compensation, and repudiation of the negotiations then under way with the Dutch. The Fighting Front rapidly grew, attracting diverse groups. In March 1946 it forced the resignation of the Indonesian Cabinet, but it was unsuccessful in forming a replacement cabinet.

Shortly thereafter the Fighting Front disintegrated; and as a result of its June 1946 attempt to overthrow and replace the Sukarno-

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Hatta Government with one headed by TAN, he was arrested and imprisoned.

Although TAN remained imprisoned from 1946 to 1948, several groups which looked to him for ideological leadership continued to be active. In mid-1948 these groups organized the Gerakan Revolusi Rakjat (GRR-People's Revolutionary Movement) in opposition to the PKI-sponsored and directed Front Demokrasi Rakjat (FDR-People's Democratic Front). Although in political opposition (for example, over support of the Hatta Government, and on the question of Indonesian neutrality in the "cold" war during the nationalist independence movement, which the GRR favored), the general programs of the two groups were close (for example, nationalization of foreign properties). In one observer's (Kahin) words: "Except for the plank in its program calling for alignment with Russia, the program of the PKI-Musso was in its essentials no different from the program which the groups within the GRR had been advocating ever since the first days of the revolution."

During this period the two parties caustically criticized each other, both attempting to assume the leadership of the developing movement of independence. The antagonism and animosity between TAN Malaka and his GRR supporters and the PKI led by Musso developed into open warfare during the Madiun Rebellion, a PKI move to capture control of the independence movement. Goaded by the kidnapping of the chairman and other officers of the GRR by PKI troops, TAN's armed supporters (Barisan Banteng) aided the Indonesian Republican Army forces in defeating the PKI military forces and proved particularly active and effective during the initial phases of the PKI rebellion. TAN himself was released from prison, where he had been since 1946, before the main battle took place at Madiun. Probably this clemency was granted in consideration of the support he and his followers had given to the Indonesian Government. During the short-lived Madiun rebellion TAN had been denounced in no uncertain terms by Musso and the PKI, being called a "Trotskyite traitor" (as were Sukarno and Hatta), and "a criminal".

In October 1948, shortly after the suppression of the Madiun Rebellion, several of the principal groups supporting TAN merged into

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the Partai Murba, formalizing their previously fairly loose relationship in the GRR. The component elements of the new political party were the Partai Rakjat (People's Party), Partai Rakjat Djelata (Poor People's Party), and the Partai Indonesia Buruh Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Labor Party). The GRR itself continued to exist as a loose federation of political parties in which the components of the new Partai Murba maintained their membership.

IV. Ideological Position of the Partai Murba

Initially the new Partai Murba had approximately 80,000 members. TAN Malaka was the ideological leader of the new party and the master-mind behind its organization, although nominal leadership was in the hands of Sukarni and Maruto Nitimihardjo, party chairman and vice chairman respectively. The objectives of the Partai Murba, as announced in its constitution framed in November 1948, included

- a. confiscation and expropriation of foreign properties,
- b. nationalization and collectivization of vital economic enterprises,
- c. establishment of a proletarian world government, and
- d. organization of the Partai Murba in accord with the principle of "democratic centralism".

The word "murba" as defined by TAN at the time the Partai Murba was organized manifested and stressed the ideological allegiance to Marx and Communism. In his definition TAN stated that "murba" is "approximately covered by the term 'proletariat'.... However, the historical development and the characteristics of the Indonesian murba are different from the Western proletariat.... Moreover, the struggle and the enemy of the Indonesian murba are different from the struggle and the enemy of the Western proletariat, especially in matters concerning detail."

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TAN went on to say, "The Indonesian murba class has suffered most under the yoke of foreign exploitation and therefore according to the theory of dialectical materialism the murba class must have the truest desire for freedom and the strongest desire for freedom.... By forming an Indonesian murba organization with steel discipline and by executing a tactic and strategy which are best fitted to the Indonesian murba, the Indonesian murba will play the historic role which is imposed upon it, namely: TO ORGANIZE AND MOBILIZE ALL REVOLUTIONARY POWERS OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE WITH THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THE AGGRESSION OF THE CAPITALISTS AND IMPERIALISTS AND LAYING DOWN THE FOUNDATION OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IN INDONESIA." (TAN's capitalization.)

The Partai Murba originally combined its Communist orientation with an appeal to nationalist sentiments. Although the party never specifically disclaimed or admitted its allegiance to the international Communist line, its position is indicated by its early statements and actions. In November 1948 TAN wrote: "The international controversy is a struggle between two systems, capitalism and socialism.... We need time in order to take a definite attitude, although we know that victory will be ours and the proletariat will win.... The part of the globe in which our country lies cannot be excluded from the world controversy. However, this does not necessarily mean that we must participate in the dispute, i. e., join one of the parties in order to attack the other. The primary conditions for an alliance are: (1) to increase one's own strength and weaken that of the enemy; and (2) to take care that you are not eaten up by your ally." TAN added, "Geographically and strategically speaking it is not yet time to choose one of the parties. Land, air and sea distances are not yet favorable for increasing our power if we make an alliance with the Federation of the Socialist Countries." (This statement was made prior to the Chinese Communist takeover in China.)

In these early days of its existence the Partai Murba apparently attempted to establish itself as the "legitimate" Communist party of Indonesia. In addition to issuing statements such as that quoted above, the Partai Murba vehemently attacked the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), which had reestablished and reorganized itself in 1945 and which had just suffered the disgrace of the abortive Madiun

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Rebellion of 1948. Partai Murba leaders, claiming to be the true exponents of orthodox Soviet Communism, were convinced that Communism was the wave of the future and that the Soviet Union would ultimately triumph over the United States. The Partai Murba discredited the Madiun Rebellion as a Communist-inspired attempt to seize control, claiming that the Rebellion was Dutch-inspired and that the PKI leaders Alimin and Musso were Dutch secret agents. Behind these charges lay Partai Murba efforts to gain dominance in Indonesia through a combination of the appeals of Communism and nationalism.

V. Comparison of Partai Murba and PKI Constitutions

The Constitution of the Partai Murba contains most of the provisions found in the constitutions of orthodox Communist parties. Although it is less detailed than, for example, the Constitution of the PKI, it outlines the organizational structure and the objectives of the party, the responsibilities and obligations of party members, and the strict disciplinary requirement of "democratic centralism". The Constitution pays no explicit homage to Marx, Lenin, or to any other Communist leader; however, it does by implication recognize its ideological dependence upon the Communist apostles.

The following comparison of excerpts from the Constitutions of the Partai Murba and the PKI indicates close parallels between the parties' structures and objectives.

| <u>Partai Murba</u> | <u>PKI</u> |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| "The organizational basis shall be democratic centralism." | "The structural organization of the party is based on the principle of democratic centralism, that is, centralism based on democracy and democracy under centralized leadership." |
| "The aim of the party is a socialist country." | "[The PKI] fights for the establishment of a People's Democracy system in Indonesia, while its |

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Partai Murba

"...demand the immediate implementation of the fundamental rights of a People's Democracy."

"May Indonesian workers succeed in forming a workers' organization with an iron discipline in carrying out those tactics and strategy best suited for the country."

"The Murba...will urge all the people to establish a People's Democracy, so that the nation of Indonesia will be free from all imperialist and fascist influence."

"The duties to be undertaken by the Partai Murba as a whole shall also be obligatory for all members individually."

PKI

further aim is the realization of a Socialist society as the first step toward a Communist society in Indonesia."

"The PKI is organized on the basis of democratic centralism as a united and militant organization, steeled with discipline that is based on consciousness, which applies to all its members."

"A People's Democracy government is a government which is able to unite all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces."

"Each party member must obey the decisions of the party organization to which he belongs...and all parts of the Party organization must obey the Central Committee."

Despite these parallels in structure, organization, and objectives, there is sharp divergence on one significant point: the relationship between the party and the International Communist Movement. Although both base their programs on "dialectical materialism", the Constitution of the Partai Murba, unlike the PKI's, makes no mention of the "theories" or "contributions" of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, or Musso. In addition, the Partai Murba discounts any connection with the "international proletariat", in obvious contrast to the PKI position. The following quotes are illustrative:

Partai Murba

"...the historical development and the character of the Murba

PKI

"...the duties of the PKI...
/include/...to be united with the

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Partai Murba

of Indonesia are different from those of the proletariat of the West.... Moreover, the nature of the struggle and the character of the enemies of the Murba of Indonesia are different from those facing the Western proletariat."

PKI

international proletariat, with all oppressed nations, subject nations, and nations which consider us their equals, which love freedom, democracy, and world peace."

One article in the Partai Murba Constitution that is of particular interest includes a provision permitting the dissolution of the party by a vote of a special party congress or by a referendum. This provision, not found in the constitutions of orthodox Communist parties, enables the Partai Murba to merge with or be absorbed by other parties.

VI. Influence in the Indonesian Government

The Partai Murba has been unable to increase its size or to expand its influence and control of mass front organizations. Its current membership is considerably less than when first formed, and it never established the constellation of mass front organizations envisioned by TAN Malaka. Such influence in front organizations as it has today is a continuation of what existed in its early days, in marked contrast to the development and proliferation of PKI front organizations. From its beginning, the numerical strength of the party has remained relatively insignificant, particularly in comparison to the strength of the PKI, which exploited a similar mixture of Communism and nationalism. From its initial estimated strength of 80,000 in 1948, the Partai Murba has decreased in membership to approximately 35,000, concentrated primarily in the Central and West Java areas.

Similarly, its representation in the Indonesian Parliament has remained relatively insignificant. In 1950, in the first Parliament following complete independence and the creation of a unitary state, the Partai Murba held three seats. Today, in the Parliament elected in the country's first general elections in 1955, the Partai Murba has only two seats, out of a total of 260. In the 1955 general Parliamentary

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elections, the Partai Murba received approximately 200,000 votes. Membership and voting strength of the Partai Murba is concentrated in Java, also the center of PKI membership and electoral strength. In the larger Constituent Assembly, charged with the writing of a Constitution, Partai Murbaholds four seats.

Despite its limited size, however, the Partai Murba today has significant influence, disproportionate to its numerical strength, in the executive branch of the Indonesian Government. In the current Cabinet, appointed by Sukarno in early 1957, two of the twenty-four ministers are closely aligned with the Partai Murba. These two are Dr. Prijono, Minister of Education and Culture, and Chairul Saleh, Minister of Veterans Affairs. Dr. Prijono is a member of the Partai Murba, chairman of the Communist front Indonesia-China Friendship Association, a member of the World Peace Council, and winner in 1955 of the Stalin Peace Prize. Saleh, who in 1956 returned from Europe after four years of "study exile", is a close adviser to Sukarno, and in particular advised him on his concept of "guided democracy". In the years immediately after World War II, Saleh was one of TAN Malaka's key lieutenants and guerrilla leaders. In 1949 he had been imprisoned by Sukarno for continuing TAN Malaka's policy of non-acceptance of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations then taking place and for his continued guerrilla activities. He remained in prison until 1952, when he was released to accept exile. Since Saleh's return, both the Partai Murba and the PKI have made overtures to him, but Saleh has not overtly or covertly identified himself with any political party.

Although the PKI considers both Prijono and Saleh as Partai Murba followers, as "national Communists", and as "no friends of the party", it has never overtly attacked or denounced either of them. Probably this abstention is in deference to their positions and influence in certain Communist target groups, i.e., Prijono's influence among intellectuals and Saleh's influence among veterans. Covertly, the PKI has attempted to frustrate Saleh's organization of veterans groups and to block any enhancement of his influence.

In the National Council of the Indonesian Government, the forty-seven man body formed by Sukarno as part of his "guided democracy"

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concept, the Partai Murba also shows an influence beyond its numerical strength. At least three Partai Murba leaders, including Sukarni, the Secretary General of the party, sit on the Council. Two other members of the National Council were in the past closely associated with the Partai Murba and its front organizations, but their current affiliation is uncertain. One of these two, Sidik Kertapati, is apparently now more closely aligned with the PKI than with the Partai Murba. It should be noted that Sukarni is the only leader of a political party on the National Council.

VII. Front Organizations

Following the pattern of the established political parties of Indonesia, the Partai Murba has a number of front organizations. Although there is little information available on the organizational activities of the Partai Murba's fronts, what is known indicates that they are small in size, weak in organization, and limited in influence.

Partai Murba front activities are conducted primarily in the labor and peasant field, the usual areas of activity for Indonesian political parties and their front organizations. In labor, Partai Murba controls SOBRI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Republik Indonesia - Central Labor Organization of the Republic of Indonesia). One of the smaller labor federations, it is comprised mainly of unions of workers on "estates", in sugar mills, and in electrical plants. Its estimated size today is 30,000, about one-half of its estimated 1954 strength.

Several years ago SOBRI made application to affiliate with WFTU, the international Communist labor front. Although the application was taken under consideration, no action has been indicated. There is no indication that the application has been withdrawn or rejected, and it must be presumed to be still under consideration. If so, there is an increased probability that SOBRI's application will be accepted by WFTU, in view of a recently adopted change in WFTU policy. Before October 1957 WFTU accepted only one affiliate per country, and for Indonesia SOBSI was the affiliate. However, WFTU has now removed this limitation.

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Less significant fronts exist among peasants and youth, SAKTI (Sarekat Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasants Federation) and ACOMA (Angkatan Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Youth Corps). Both of these Partai Murba fronts are splinters of large organizations that came under PKI domination. The original SAKTI, organized by the Partai Murba in 1949, merged in 1955 with the PKI peasant front, the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasants Association). A splinter group under Partai Murba direction retained the name SAKTI. ACOMA also split in two in 1952, both elements retaining the same name, one under PKI domination, the other under Partai Murba control.

Although there is no indication that the Partai Murba has its own "peace", "friendship", or "cultural relations" front organizations in competition with the PKI, the activity of Dr. Prijono, a Partai Murba man, in organizing and directing the activities of the PKI fronts in these spheres, is significant.

VIII. Relationships Between the Partai Murba and the PKI

Since the formation of the Partai Murba a number of reports have suggested a rapprochement or a merger between the Partai Murba and the PKI. Most of these reports originated during the 1955 election campaigns. There is no evidence, however, of any formal or direct negotiations or conversations between the two parties to carry out such a purpose; neither party has issued any overt statements or made any overt action directly supporting the unity of the two parties. Nevertheless, there does exist close contact between officials and important members of the two parties. In particular, in mass front organizations and in the Indonesian Parliament, the members of the parties show a unity of purpose and of action. Similarly, in the Sukarno-appointed National Council, the known or suspected members of the two parties show a marked degree of agreement in policies and programs. Although there is no substantive difference between the programs of the Partai Murba and the PKI insofar as the direction of the future internal development of Indonesia is concerned, the manifested unity and agreement between the two parties should not be taken ipso facto as evidence of coordination between the two parties, or of one party directing the other.

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In the Indonesian Parliament the two Partai Murba representatives are members of the Progressive National "faction" ("faction" is the term used in the Indonesian Parliament to denote members of a single political party or groups of several parties acting as a single coordinated group in the Steering Committee of Parliament). Other members of the Progressive National faction include representatives of PKI front organizations, e.g. BAPERKI, PERMAI, and ACOMA, and the faction itself is considered to be PKI-controlled.

As mentioned previously, the Partai Murba is well-represented in both the Cabinet and the National Council. Obviously, in these bodies Partai Murba members have close and continuous contact with the several known or suspected members of the PKI. In the continuing crises in Indonesia, beginning with the Cabinet crisis in 1956, the Partai Murba as a party and as represented in the executive bodies has supported in general the PKI positions. The party has appeared at times to be assuming almost a median position between the PKI and the other political parties, but in no case has the Partai Murba been in opposition to the basic principles underlying the PKI solutions, e.g., formation of the National Council, unconditional surrender of the Sumatran "rebels", etc.

Several leading Partai Murba members hold major positions in PKI front organizations. As mentioned above, Dr. Prijono, in particular, has been active in both the national and international levels of orthodox Communist organizations. He was one of the founders of the Indonesian Peace Committee and served as its chairman. In 1955 Prijono was "elected" to the World Peace Council, the international directing organ of the Communist World Peace Movement. In the same year he was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize for "promotion of peace among nations". In addition, two other members of the Partai Murba group in the National Council aided in the founding of the Indonesian Peace Committee and are still major voices therein. One, Mohammad Padang, is a known member of the Partai Murba; the other, Achmad Chatib, although not known as a Partai Murba member, was closely associated with TAN in the 1920's and in the immediate post-World War II period.

Among the peasant and youth groups contact or cooperation, if any,

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between the large PKI groups and the small Partai Murba groups is unknown. As noted above, the Partai Murba groups in those fields merged with PKI fronts, leaving only remnant groups to continue under Partai Murba domination. Almost nothing is known about these moves, how they were effected, who was instrumental, etc. It is known that Sidik Kertapati, now a member of the National Council, and in the past considered to be sympathetic to the Partai Murba, was instrumental in merging SAKTI with the BTI--the PKI peasant front--in 1955. Sidik's political affiliation is today uncertain. At the time of the merger of the peasant groups Sidik moved from chairmanship of SAKTI to membership on the BTI's Central Council. When the PKI Headquarters were attacked with hand grenades in July 1956, Sidik was meeting with Aidit, the PKI's Secretary General, and other top PKI officials.

IX. Summary and Conclusions

As a Marxian party, the Partai Murba of today does not challenge the dominant position of the PKI. It is a splinter Communist party, a remnant of the organization and political ideology developed by TAN Malaka, nurtured in opposition to the PKI during the post-World War II independence movement. Almost completely lacking in organization, and without any sizable following in the electorate, the Partai Murba as a political body is relatively unimportant. It represents no political threat to the major parties in Indonesia.

TAN's effort in the 1920's to establish a cadre Communist party rather than a mass party has given rise to the speculation that the Partai Murba's lack of mass membership may be the result of choice and design. However, the several earmarks of a successfully established cadre party, e.g., a well-knit organizational structure, well-developed control of membership, and as a possible concomitant, influence or control over significant mass organizations, are present only to a very limited extent in the Partai Murba. There is apparently little control of the loosely organized membership. The fronts which are under party control are similarly small, relatively insignificant, and in general are related to the PKI fronts as is the Partai Murba to the PKI.

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However, the influence of certain leading members of the Partai Murba, particularly in the higher echelons of the Government and in Communist front organizations, cannot be denied. Cumulatively, their influence is disproportionate, far in excess of the relative political stature of the Partai Murba itself. Examination of the activities and positions of those persons indicates that although they have some degree of affiliation with the Partai Murba, they have reached their current positions of power and influence independently. Their current status does not appear to be a result of activities in or on behalf of the Partai Murba. Therefore, it cannot be said that the party itself has extensive influence as a political organization at the top level of the Indonesian Government; the influence is rather that of its members as individuals or of those closely affiliated with it at one time or another.

The interesting relationship between the Partai Murba and the PKI presents several apparent paradoxes. Although the two parties vilify and condemn each other, members of both parties cooperate on the National Council, in the Cabinet, and in PKI-dominated front organizations. Cooperation between individual members of the Partai Murba and the PKI should not be taken to imply that there is coordination between the two parties. There is no direct evidence to indicate any coordination of policies or activities of the two parties, or of their individual members.

Nevertheless, the question of coordinated Partai Murba-PKI policy should be examined, in view of parallel party programs and policies and of the cooperation in top Government echelons, as well as in national and international Communist front organizations. There are three hypotheses: (a) there is active covert coordination between the two parties; (b) the policies are coordinated by a third force, e.g., Moscow, with or without the knowledge of the PKI leadership; or, (c) there is no direct coordination.

Both (a) and (b) can be supported by substantial circumstantial evidence, including parallel policies and programs. Similarly, the presence of both Partai Murba and PKI personalities in leading positions within several Communist front organizations is also circumstantial evidence. Under these hypotheses, the existence of small

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Partai Murba fronts, and the charges and countercharges, would have to be considered as camouflage intended to suggest a separateness that does not actually exist. One particular piece of evidence is impressive if interpreted in the light of these hypotheses: the return in 1956 of Semaun, founder and first president of the original PKI, after thirty years of exile in the Soviet Union. The Partai Murba was instrumental in urging his return, nominating Semaun for the Indonesian National Assembly--prior to his return--and urging Sukarno, prior to his 1956 trip to the USSR, to arrange the return with appropriate Soviet authorities. The prevalent rumor before his return was to the effect that Semaun, under Soviet direction, would reorganize the Communist movement in Indonesia and that he would effect a merger of the two parties. Since his return, Semaun has not become affiliated with either party, although both have made overtures to him. Currently, he acts almost as an "elder statesman", urging the creation of a new world bank to aid the development and industrialization of backward countries. He has also become a close adviser to Sukarno and is believed to have been influential in Sukarno's efforts to implement the "guided democracy" concept.

If the Partai Murba serves as a Communist front organization, as some observers suggest, it is a useful tool for the Communist movement in Indonesia. As such, it can bring pressure upon President Sukarno and upon other high government echelons indirectly, without direct participation by the PKI or PKI personalities. It can also serve as a useful link with non-Communist parties and organizations.

The third hypothesis (c), which states that there is no direct coordination between the two parties, is the most probable. From the PKI's viewpoint, there is no need for such coordination. The Partai Murba's programs and policies parallel the PKI's. The Partai Murba generally supports, in substance if not in detail, the PKI's "analysis" of and decisions on specific events. In the higher echelons of Government, and in the PKI front organizations, the Partai Murba members also support the PKI positions. Direct coordination between the two parties would imply PKI recognition of a political stature and position that the Partai Murba does not have.

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The small size of the Partai Murba, its loose organization, and the activities of its leading members suggest a possible willingness to collaborate with the stronger and more influential PKI. However, any initiative toward this end would probably have to originate with the PKI. At this time it appears that the PKI has little need and would gain little from implementing direct coordination of policies with the Partai Murba.

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